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Abstract
This study examines in which cases economic forces or historical singularities
prevail in the determination of the spatial distribution of retail shops. We de-
velop a relatively general model of location choice in discrete space. The main
force towards an agglomerated structure is the reduction of transaction costs
for consumers if retailers are located closely, whilst competition and transport
costs work towards a disperse structure. We assess the importance of the initial
conditions by simulating the resulting distribution of shops for identical eco-
nomic parameters but varying initial settings. If the equilibrium distributions
are similar we conclude that economic forces have prevailed, while dissimilarity
indicates that ’history’ is more important. The (dis)similarity of distributions
of shops is calculated by means of a metric measure.
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Founder of a shop have to decide simultaneously on a number of questions. One of
these questions, which are crucial for the proﬁtability or even survivability of the ﬁrm,
is the location. Should it be located where competitors are most distant, or is it prof-
itable to locate where the competitors are and many consumers are attracted? In any
case, the locations of the incumbent shops matter for the choice of a newcomer. The
locations of these ﬁrms in turn have been chosen taking into account the distribution
of the then incumbent ﬁrms, and so on. This path dependency brings about that the
initial situation may determine to some extent the long-run distribution of shops. We
refer to the initial situation as ’history’ throughout this study, as opposed to economic
forces like the demand and the costs structure of ﬁrms. Of course, ’history’ rarely fully
determines the choices of all subsequently entering shops. Rather, the distribution
of ﬁrms is shaped simultaneously by both, path dependencies and economic forces,
’history’ and ’economy’, which mutually interact with varying relative weigh until a
stationary situation is reached.
The aim of this study is to examine in which cases economic forces or historical
singularities prevail in the determination of the long-run distribution of retail shops.
A glance at the actual distribution of diﬀerent shops reveals that the factors which
decide on the best location may be varying. Therefore, we do not hope to ﬁnd that
one determinant is generally more important than the other, or vice versa. Instead we
intend to identify conditions that increase the probability that ’history’ or ’economy’
decide the ﬁnal distribution of shops. The reason why we restrict the analysis to
ﬁnal or ’equilibrium’ distributions of ﬁrms is that the inﬂuence of the initial situation
may only be temporarily in some cases. Consider for example the simple case, where
the stationary long-run distribution of ﬁrms is even, with one ﬁrm at each discrete
location. This situation may be reached from varying initial distributions of ﬁrms,
hence ’history’ has no impact on the ﬁrms’ long-run distribution. Yet, until the ﬁnal
situation is reached, each newcomer chooses a location that is not already occupied
by other ﬁrms, i.e. the incumbents’ locations matter temporarily.
Furthermore, we restrict our analysis to the distribution of retail shops within
cities, i.e. at a relatively low geographic scale. The reason is that at a larger geographic
scale the partial equilibrium view we employ would not be appropriate. If, for instance,
one is concerned with the concentration of ﬁnancial institutions in London, or with the
concentration of sports car manufacturers around Modena in Italy, the consideration
of specialized labor or the self-reinforcing eﬀect of a large market would matter1. These
1We do not focus on the question under which conditions agglomerations arise, since both, eco-
1’forward and backward linkages’ that play such a prominent role in the ’New Economic
Geography’ (see Fujita, Krugman and Venables, 1999) require a general equilibrium
framework. Yet, at a lower geographic scale these eﬀects lose some of their importance,
so that a partial equilibrium framework may suﬃce to explain the location choices.
For instance, in many cities antique shops and fashion boutiques are concentrated
strongly in one or a few streets. But neither of them requires specialized labor that
could make up an advantage for neighboring locations. In the same vein, we question
that the income that these shops generate reinforces the demand for their products
to such an extent that it is proﬁtable to be located where other shops are. Instead
of forward and backward linkages our study considers another positive externality of
agglomerations, namely the saving of transaction costs. If similar shops are located
close together, it is easier for consumers to gather information on prices and quality
of the goods. Therefore, more consumers are frequenting the shops. Ironically, this
only works if competition among shops is intense, so that ﬁrms are actually attracted
by competition instead of ﬂeeing it. Another example for the reduction of transaction
costs through concentration is the time and money consumers have to spend searching
for a suitable parking lot. These costs are ﬁxed in that they are independent of the
amount actually purchased. They bring about that we frequent a large market hall
where many retailer sell their vegetables, rather than buying from a single tradesmen
two corners away. We argue that these ﬁxed costs per ﬁrm decrease with the number
of frequented shops at the same location. Hence, a ﬁrm which shares its location with
one or more competitors is more likely to be chosen by a consumer than an otherwise
identical ﬁrm which is alone at its location. The trade-oﬀ between this centripetal
and other centrifugal forces determines the long-run distribution of retail shops.
The study is organized as follows: First we develop a theoretical model of the
sequential location choice of retailers in discrete space. In section 3 this model is used
to simulate the long-run patterns of locations for varying economic parameters. To
assess the extent to which economic forces or historic singularities mold the distribu-
tion of shops, we carry out this exercise for diﬀerent initial settings and compare the
outcomes. If the distributions are identical, regardless of the initial situation, eco-
nomic forces prevailed over ’history’. If the distributions are ’very diﬀerent’, ’history’
is more important. How diﬀerent distributions of ﬁrms are is quantiﬁed by means
of a ’measure of dissimilarity’, which is build such that it fulﬁlls a number of basic
requirements. Section 4 summarizes the main results and concludes.
nomic forces and ’history’ may operate against or in favor of agglomeration. Yet, because we model
the location choice of ﬁrms to assess the importance of these determinants, the degree of spatial
concentration is determined as a by-product.
22 The model
In order to keep the model manageable, we have to make a number of restrictive
assumptions in the following. As Antoine de Saint-Exupéry said: ”Perfection is
achieved, not when there is nothing more to add, but when there is nothing left
to take away.“ Even though we know that perfection is hardly ever obtainable, we try
to take this motto to heart throughout the following analysis, completing it by the
appropriate constraint to the minimization problem.
The most famous precursor of our approach is Hotelling (1929). Since then the
model has been altered in a number of ways, e.g. by Smithies (1941), Eaton and
Lipsey (1975), D’Aspremont, Gabszewicz and Thisse (1979). A recent contribution
to this ﬁeld is Economides, Howell and Meza (2002). This literature focuses on the
conditions that cause the so-called ’principle of minimum diﬀerentiation’ to become
or not to become eﬀective, and on the stability of the ﬁrms’ locational choices.
Assume a linear market of length r, bounded at both ends (see ﬁgure 1). Each
position of the market is a possible location for the single-outlet shops. The set of
possible locations is denoted by D = {1,...,r}. Locations are diﬀerentiated by their
relative position to the left market boundary, that is, the outmost left location is
denoted location 1. Apart from their relative spatial position all locations are equal
ex ante. In particular, the distance from one location to a neighboring location is
always unity, demand is distributed homogenously. The latter is standardized to one
without loss of generality, so that buyers i = 1,2,...r may be identiﬁed by the index
of their location. For instance, buyer k resides on the kth position of the market,
counted from the left boundary. The assumption that consumer locations remain
ﬁxed is a severe, but necessary, restriction of the analysis. It implies that we should
interpret the emerging pattern of shop agglomeration as being relative to consumer
location.
possible locations
1 2 3 r-2 r-1 r | {z }
unit distance
Fig. 1: Linear market with discrete locations
3Each ﬁrm j produces the amount xj of a diﬀerentiated commodity. The number
of ﬁrms and heterogenous goods is denoted n, and the set of all ﬁrms is S = {1,...,n}.
The function f : S → D assigns to each ﬁrm its respective location, i.e. ﬁrm j locates
at market position f(j).
2.1 The demand side
Utility of a representative buyer depends upon the consumed amount of the heteroge-
nous goods, xi,j. We assume a concave CES utility function, which permits that one












, with ρ ∈ (0,1]. (1)
This utility function implies that the elasticity of substitution equals σ = 1/(1−ρ) > 1.
σ does not depend on the consumer prices, which diﬀer among the shops supplying
consumer i2 with goods, due to varying transport costs. The latter brings about that
the price index Pi also diﬀers between consumers.
Here, a few more deﬁnitions are at order: The subset of S, which contains all
shops that actually supply consumer k with goods is denoted by Sk ≡ {s ∈ S : xk,j > 0}
with S =
Sr
i=1 Si, i.e. each variety is purchased by at least one consumer. In analogy,
the set of locations of the shops in Si is denoted by Di. The number of shops at loca-
tion ` ∈ D is denoted n` ≡ |{s ∈ S : f(s) = `}|, and the number of shops at location
` ∈ Di from which shopper i buys is ni,` ≡ |{s ∈ Si : f(s) = `}|.
Buying goods at locations other than the consumer’s respective position incurs
iceberg transport costs at rate T > 1, i.e. if buyer k is willing to consume xk,m
unities of ﬁrm m’s commodity, she actually would have to buy xk,m ·T |k−f(m)| unities.
The fraction of goods that melts away during transport is (T − 1)/T. This implies
that from the point of view of this consumer the price of ﬁrm m’s commodity is
pk,m = pm · T |k−f(m)|, where pm denotes ﬁrm m’s mill price. The price index of
















Apart from the mill price plus transport costs, each buyer incurs transaction
costs ai,j for each good she actually demands, which are independent of the quantity
2Recall that the number of consumers is standardized to the number of positions of the market,
and that consumers are identiﬁed by the position they have.
4purchased. These costs’ eﬀect on the consumers’ behavior is that the amount a
consumer wishes to buy is subject to a lower threshold below which the advantage
of an increased variety does not suﬃce to outweigh the additional transaction costs.
The amount of transaction costs consumer i has to pay for buying from a retailer at
location ` depends on ni,`:
ai,` =
γ
(ni,`)α, with α ∈ [0,1] (3)
where γ are the transaction costs if a consumer buys from only one shop at location
`. The parameter α represents the advantage of co-location. In the case α = 0,
transaction costs per shop are γ, no matter how many shops at location ` a consumer
chooses, hence no transaction costs can be saved. In the case α = 1, transaction
costs per location are independent of the number of shops, hence the advantage of
buying from several shops at the same location is the greatest. Intermediate values
of α imply that, if a consumer buys from an additional shop at location `, total
transaction costs increase, but average transaction costs per shop decrease. α thus
represents the positive eﬀect of a retail shop choosing a location close to other shops on
demand. This eﬀect is partially external to the newcomer, and is a type of economies
of localization (see e.g. Anas, Arnott and Small, 1998, p. 1446)
Transaction costs are a crucial feature of our model. They provoke that the
model exhibits two most welcome features. First, the reduction in transaction costs
that a consumer experiences if two shops are located at the same position constitutes
a positive external eﬀect of an agglomeration, i.e. an incentive to co-locate. This
eﬀect is much easier to model than the ’forward and backward linkages’ that play
a similar role in the ’New Economic Geography’. Second, these transaction costs
prevent consumers from buying arbitrary small amounts of each variety, which is a
property of the basic Dixit and Stiglitz (1977)-model.
Consumers maximize their utility subject to a budget constraint. Their income
net of transaction costs yi is
yi = ψ −
X
`∈Di





where ψ is the exogenous and equal gross income per consumer. Consumers spends











(xi,j · pi,j). (4)
If consumer i’s demand for ﬁrm m’s commodity is positive, m ∈ Si, the amount
actually purchased can be found by maximizing utility function (1) under budget






















The ﬁrst-order conditions state that the derivatives with respect to all xi
j,j ∈ Si equal





















Other things being equal, this relationship implies that buyer i’s demand for the
heterogenous good m depends positively on her net income and the price index, and
it depends negatively on the price of the good itself. The price elasticity of demand
equals σ, and is independent of the distance between a retailer and a consumer.
Adding one shop to the set of shops Sk from which consumer k buys aﬀects her
utility in various ways. On the one hand, for the class of utility functions assumed
(ρ < 1), she values the increased variety. On the other hand, total transaction costs
increase if α < 1, which lowers the amount of money she can spend on consumption.
In the optimum, she and all other consumers may therefore not buy every ﬁrm’s
good, which limits the number of ﬁrms that is actually able to survive in the market.
In comparison with related models of monopolistic competition without transaction
costs, e.g. by Dixit and Stiglitz (1977), this means that c.p. consumers’ demand is
concentrated on less retailers.
Consumer i compares every possible combination among all shops and locations
from which she may buy goods, and chooses the combination that brings about the
highest utility. In doing so, she may well leave out a shop that increases utility by
more than another one but which has the disadvantage of an isolated location.
2.2 The supply side
Each shop is free to choose the proﬁt-maximizing price for its variety. The maximiza-
tion problem of a representative retailer thus reads:
max
pj
πj = (pj − 1) · xj − F (7)
6where π denotes retailer j’s price, variable costs per unit output are standardized to
unity, and ﬁxed costs are denoted by F and equal for all retailers. The ﬁrst-order
condition for a proﬁt maximum is




The optimal price pj depends on the price elasticity of demand. Due to the
assumed CES-utility function, the price elasticity of demand is σ = 1/(1 − ρ) for all
consumers at all locations. Unfortunately, this does not imply that the elasticity of
one retailer’s aggregate demand is σ as well. For any given number of consumers,
the price elasticity of aggregate demand is σ.3 But, for some values of pj, one or the
other consumer will be indiﬀerent between buying from shop j or not. If the price
is still higher, she will not buy from this shop at all, and if it is lower, she will buy
a discrete positive amount. Mathematically, at these points ps
j, essential singularities
of the individual demand functions emerge, due to the discrete nature of the model.
Where the singularities emerge depends, among other things, on the prices of the
competitors, which, for their part, depend on the elasticity of demand. We decided to
circumvent this problem by assuming that each retailer takes the sets of shops from
which ’their’ consumers buy as given to them.4 Only then, the (conjectured) price
elasticity of aggregate demand equals the individual price elasticity, σ.






Hence the mill price of each ﬁrm is the same: pj = p = 1/ρ ∀j ∈ S. But, of course,
the consumer prices pi,j may vary because of transport costs: pi,j = pj · T |i−f(j)| =



























3By the way, this is the reason why the use of a CES-utility function is so advantageous in most
models of the ’New Economic Geography’, e.g. the core-periphery model (Fujita et al., 1999).
4Our assumption is even more restrictive than the Lösch-conjecture in the theory of spatial
competition, according to which each ﬁrm considers the extension of its market area as being given
(see Capozza and Van Order, 1978). Since the price index (2) exhibits jump discontinuities whenever
a consumer varies the number of ﬁrms she frequents, it does not suﬃce to assume that ﬁrms consider
the number of their clients as being stable.
7Making use of (6) and (11), proﬁts of ﬁrm m read:











































A potential newcomer in the market calculates the maximum proﬁts which would
yield at each market position. The position which is associated with the highest
positive proﬁts on the drawing board is chosen and becomes the location of the shop.
The decision is ﬁnal because no retailer can move its site once it is settled, e.g. due
to high relocation costs. A formal reason to forbear from the possibility of relocation
is that otherwise we would run into the quadratic assignment problem, for which
Koopmans and Beckmann (1957, p. 69) showed that “no price system on plants, on
locations and on commodities in all locations, that is regarded as given by plant
owners, say, will sustain any assignment.” Assuming that a newcomer takes into
consideration only the potential proﬁts for the given actual distribution of other shops
is quite restrictive. In particular, one might expect that an entrant’s prospects about
future entries enter into the decision, which would be necessary to derive a subgame-
perfect equilibrium (see e.g. Economides et al., 2002). Allowing for such strategic
interdependencies would yet complicate the structure of the problem to such an extent
that one could not hope to arrive at a conclusion. Formally, this would amount to a
location game in which the number of moves and the number of players themselves
depend on the moves of the players.
2.3 Equilibrium
As in the classic Dixit and Stiglitz (1977)-model the optimal number of ﬁrms / het-
erogenous goods is determined by the trade-oﬀ between decreasing average costs and
the consumers’ preference for variety. In comparison to the continuous Dixit-Stiglitz
model, our approach is discrete, which implies that proﬁts are not necessarily zero
or even equal for all ﬁrms in equilibrium. Decreasing ﬁxed costs do not necessarily
come along with a rising number of ﬁrms in our model. Instead, the eﬀects of such
changes depend on whether speciﬁc threshold values are exceeded or not. The discrete
structure of the model also renders possible that a small variation causes large-scale
modiﬁcations of the spatial distribution of retail shops.
8A second trade-oﬀ decides the spatial distribution of the ﬁrms. To discuss the
eﬀects on the ﬁrms’ locational choices it is useful to understand space as a phenomenon
that protects ﬁrms from competition. A high preference for variety (low elasticity of
substitution between the goods, ρ close to zero) means that competition is weak.
Yet, Koeniger and Licandro (2004) show that this interpretation is wrong in the
context of the standard Dixit-Stiglitz general equilibrium model, since variations of
the substitutability do not aﬀect the relative price of consumption goods, implying
that the decentralized equilibrium is optimal. In our model, though, an increase of
substitutability aﬀects output directly. Households reduce the number of consumed
varieties because of the transaction costs that come along with each variety. Hence,
the degree of competition rises. Firms thus tend to co-locate, if the elasticity of
substitution is low. Another force in favor of concentration is caused by the transaction
costs. If co-location saves transaction costs, ﬁrms which co-locate are more attractive
to consumers and thus increase proﬁts. In comparison, high transportation costs make
it proﬁtable to be located where demand is, i.e. dispersedly.
A crucial question that has to be answered at this point is: what concept of an
equilibrium is appropriate in this model? In comparison to the Dixit and Stiglitz-
model of monopolistic competition, our model features complications as discrete
choices of locations, a discrete number of ﬁrms, and the like. Therefore, it is not
applicable to assume that ﬁrms enter the market until all ﬁrms just break even. In-
stead, ﬁrms may attain varying positive proﬁts, depending on their location. An
equilibrium is deﬁned as follows:
Deﬁnition 1 An equilibrium distribution of ﬁrms is given if all incumbent ﬁrms’
proﬁts are non-negative, and if no potential newcomer could enter the market at any
location without making a loss, given the incumbent ﬁrms’ number and locations.5
The restriction ’given the incumbent ﬁrms’ number and locations’ in this deﬁni-
tion is an important one. It could be, for instance, that a ﬁrm’s entry causes other
ﬁrms to leave the market, which would render the ﬁrm proﬁtable. Thus, it could
pay to accept losses in the short run to gain a proﬁtable position in the long run.
For this to happen, the ﬁrms would need to foresee not only consumer behavior but
also entry and exit decisions of other ﬁrms which may strategically take a loss just
as well. On the one hand, the strategic interdependence of potential ﬁrms with other
newcomers and ﬁrms who are already in the market is certainly of great interest from
5It was just too hard to overcome the temptation to variegate Saint-Exupéry’s quotation: An
equilibrium is achieved, when there is nothing more to add, and nothing left to take away.
9a game theoretic point of view. On the other hand, we do not believe that we can
actually deal with this issue. Besides sizeable computational eﬀort even for the case
of a given number of players (ﬁrms), the main problem is that the number of players
itself depends on strategic moves of the players. Therefore, we decided to abstract
from this kind of strategic behavior.
3 Simulations
One shortcoming of our approach to deal with speciﬁc historic events and discrete
choices is that results can only be derived by means of simulation, i.e. exemplarily.
To mitigate the disadvantage that these results cannot be generalized because of the
speciﬁc historic situations they are based on, we simulate the equilibrium distribution
of retail shops for a very large number of starting positions and parameter values, a
total of 2.100 runs.
Figure 2 shows how the employed algorithm derives equilibria. Starting from a
given distribution of existing ﬁrms, hypothetic proﬁts of the newcomer are calculated
at each of the r market segments, and stored in the vector Πh. The newcomer enters
the market at the location that corresponds to the maximum of hypothetic proﬁts, if
it is nonnegative. Then, ﬁrms that would make losses exit, until the remaining ﬁrms’
proﬁts are all nonnegative, and the next iteration starts. The process stops when
the maximum proﬁts a newcomer could attain are negative. The following subsection
speciﬁes which parameter values are being used.
3.1 Speciﬁcation of variables
To give a precise picture of what happens in the model, we allow the following param-
eters to vary over a broad range of values. These three parameters are in the following
referred to as the ’economic’ parameters to distinguish them from the position of the
ﬁrst ﬁrm, which is taken as representing the ’history’.
• ρ ∈ {0.4,0.5...0.9}. This parameter determines how close substitutes the va-
rieties are. The higher it is, the more similar are the varieties perceived by
consumers, the more elastic is demand, and the more intense is competition
among ﬁrms.
• α ∈ {0,0.1...0.6}. If this parameter is zero, no transaction costs may be saved
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Fig. 2: Inside the black box
costs for two ﬁrms at one location are only about 32% higher than for one ﬁrm,
hence the advantage is quite pronounced.
• T ∈ {1.1,1.2...1.5}. Transport costs are within the range 10 – 50% of the
transported commodity per unit distance. The upper value appears unrealisti-
cally high, all the more because our analysis is intended to be related to local
agglomerations of businesses. If T = 1.5, a consumer one unit distance away
from a ﬁrm’s site would have to buy 50% more of a good than what she is
actually willing to consume, i.e. only two third of the amount bought can be
consumed. A consumer 2 units of distance away receives only (2/3)2 = 4/9 of
what the ﬁrm sent oﬀ. We chose nevertheless to consider this broad range of
parameters, primarily in order to render comparisons to other studies possible.
Parameters whose values are held constant throughout the analysis are summa-
rized in table 1. Gross income ψ is standardized to unity per household for simplicity.
11γ, the transaction costs per ﬁrm at a sole location, are 0.1, and ﬁxed costs F are 0.5.
A market length (number of positions) of about 20 seems to allow for an analysis of
edge eﬀects, without making them a dominant factor. Since 20 is even, it would not
be possible to set the location of the ﬁrst ﬁrm (the ’pioneer’) such that the market is
symmetric. Therefore we assume a market length r of 19.
Parameter: ψ γ F r
Value: 1 0.1 0.5 19
Table 1: Parameters and their values
We are interested in the extent to which the historically determined initial distri-
bution and/or economic forces shape the equilibrium distribution of retail shops. For
this aim, we need to deﬁne some initial distributions because the number of distribu-
tions of ﬁrms is unlimited ex ante. We chose to compare the outcome of the model
for diﬀerent locations of the pioneering ﬁrst ﬁrm. Only the pioneer can choose a loca-
tion without being faced by other ﬁrms. Furthermore, this ﬁrm is a pure monopolist,
which implies that its behavior cannot be described by the above algebra. It knows
that, with the assumptions made, all consumers are willing to spend all of their net
income ψ − γ on its product. Even though consumers are not indiﬀerent regarding
the pioneer’s location (due to the transport costs they bear), the ﬁrm is. Hence, its
location has to be assumed anyway. It suﬃces to consider deviations from the sym-
metric case (pioneer’s location at position 10) in one direction, because of symmetry.
Therefore we consider the following 10 cases: f(1) ∈ {1,2,...10}. If the pioneer’s
location is a position i that is not included in this set, the outcome is symmetric to
the case r + 1 − i, which is included.
3.2 Time structure of the model
For simplicity, we assume that ﬁrms enter the market one by one. Otherwise, we
either would have to cope with incorrect expectations of the ﬁrms (if other ﬁrms’
entrance is neglected), or we would run into the quadratic assignment problem (if
ﬁrms do anticipate other ﬁrms’ market entry, see Koopmans and Beckmann, 1957).
One period is deﬁned as the time span between the entry of two ﬁrms. This period
comprises – in this order – the time it takes to calculate and compare potential proﬁts
at all locations, the construction of the plant, possibly the exit of one or more ﬁrms,
production and distribution of all ﬁrms’ goods, their transport and consumption. All
ﬂow ﬁgures, like the consumers’ income or ﬁxed costs, are related to this time span.
12Consistency requires that – as in the deﬁnition of an equilibrium distribution of
shops – no ﬁrm takes losses. Since ﬁrms anticipate what their proﬁts would be if the
distribution of ﬁrms remains the same, and no expectations are made regarding future
changes of the ﬁrms’ distribution, there is no reason to take a loss. In comparison with
market entry, we allow that several ﬁrms exit the market simultaneously. Speciﬁcally,
we assume that at each location, where proﬁts of ﬁrms would be negative, one ﬁrm
abandons. If the remaining ﬁrms all attain non-negative proﬁts, the process is ﬁnished.
Otherwise it is repeated until there no ﬁrm is left which would make a loss. It is only
then, that the actual distribution of ﬁrms is determined, and consumers decide which
amount they buy from which of the remaining retail shops.
The latter implies that a ﬁrm which enters the market at the beginning of the
period may actually be mistaken, since it has not expected that other ﬁrms would exit
the market. This would not be so much a problem if the ordering of potential proﬁts
at diﬀerent locations would be unaﬀected by the perishing of ﬁrms. Unfortunately,
this must not always be the case. Therefore, it might happen that a ﬁrm enters the
market at location k, other ﬁrms perish, and this aﬀects the potential proﬁts such that
it would have been advantageous to choose a location diﬀerent from k. The reason
is that the ﬁrms’ expectations regarding the distribution of ﬁrms is static, while the
expectations regarding the behavior of consumers is rational. Note however, that this
asymmetry of expectations complies with the asymmetry of these spheres: While the
number and locations of the consumers is given to the ﬁrms from the ﬁrst period on,
the number of ﬁrms and their locations is determined endogenously in a complex and
interactive way. Therefore, we see the diﬀerent assumptions regarding expectations
towards ﬁrms and consumers as being justiﬁed in an admittedly stylized and focused
model framework.
3.3 Measuring (dis)similarity
Before we analyze how much the resulting patterns of shop agglomeration diﬀer,
depending on diﬀering positions of the pioneering ﬁrm, we need to have a measure
which is capable to account for diﬀerences along several dimensions. Patterns of
agglomeration may diﬀer with respect to the size of an agglomeration, the position
of an agglomeration, the number of agglomerations, or the total number of ﬁrms.
Which measure is chosen to compare the patterns that result from varying positions
of the pioneering ﬁrm is crucial for the question the paper addresses. The most







, µ > 0 (13)
which equals the city-block metric in the case µ = 1, and equals the Euclidean distance
in the case µ = 2. One problem with this measure is, however, that it does not account
for where the diﬀerence occurs. For instance, the value of the measure would be the
same if a ﬁrm is displaced by one or by ﬁve units distance. Also, if two distributions
only diﬀer in that one distribution has one more ﬁrm at one location, the measured
diﬀerence, (1µ)
1/µ = 1, would be lower than if that ﬁrm would be displaced by one
position, (1µ + 1µ)
1/µ = 21/µ, since in the latter case diﬀerences at two positions occur.
Another possible candidate for the measure is the so-called edit (Levinstein)
distance. This measure counts the editing eﬀort (symbol deletion, insertion or sub-
stitution), needed to transform one pattern into another. The main diﬀerence is that
the edit distance does not diﬀerentiate by how many ﬁrms two distributions diﬀer at
one segment. All sorts of diﬀerences are treated equally.
Since these measures strike as unsatisfactory, a measure that is more ’problem-





































This measure displays a number of desirable features, which are discussed in detail in
the appendix. The basic intuition is that the minimum number of movements of ﬁrms
is counted that would be necessary in order to transform one distribution into another
one, i.e. it measures the ’eﬀort’ it takes to produce two identical distributions.
3.4 Results
The following results are based on the measure of dissimilarity (MOD), deﬁned in
(14). Table 2 illustrates the dissimilitude of the equilibrium distributions, depending
on the locations of the pioneers. Note that each value in table 2 is the average of 210
MOD values. If, for instance, the equilibrium distributions of ﬁrms that yield from
the pioneer being located at market position 3 are taken as the reference (f(1) = 3),
and the outcome of the cases with f(1) = 5 are being compared to them, the MOD
takes values between 0 and 121, depending on the parameters α, ρ and T. The
average of these values is 19.16 (7th row, 9th column). Of course, the value is the
same, if the distributions that yield from f(1) = 5 are deﬁned the reference, and those
corresponding to f(1) = 3 are compared to it (9th row, 7th column).
14The last row of table 2 averages over the average values of the MOD, excluding the
0 which results if the outcomes are compared to themselves, respectively (see axiom 1
in the appendix). It turns out that the average value of the MOD is relatively low
(20.58) if the symmetric cases (f(1) = 10) are chosen as reference. If the outcome of
other initial distributions is deﬁned as reference, the average value of the MOD ﬁrst
increases with the deviation from the symmetric cases. The distributions of ﬁrms with
an initial distribution f(1) = 7 feature the highest average MOD: 23.78. With a still
higher distance of the pioneer’s location, possibly surprisingly, lower average values of
the MOD yield, so that, with the exception of the special case when the border position
is deﬁned the reference, an inverted U-shaped relationship arises. The minimum is
reached if the outcomes of the cases with f(1) = 2 are used as reference: 20.56. In
the case f(1) = 1 (the pioneer is located in the left-most position), the average MOD
is higher again.
How can we explain the described inverted U-shaped relationship between the
position of the pioneer and the value of the MOD of the resulting distributions of
shops, i.e. the U-shaped relationship between the position of the pioneer and the
similarity of the outcome? To answer this question, it is useful to bear in mind that a
location in the center of the market is optimal in that it minimizes average transport
costs of all consumers. If the pioneer is located there, and with sizable advantages
of a common location (saving of transaction costs), it is likely that an agglomeration
arises at the center of the market. If, however, the pioneer is located nearby the center,
this may become the location of several retailers, which causes the ﬁnal distribution
to be diﬀerent. A location in the more peripheral positions in contrast, may not
be sustainable in some cases because subsequently entering retailers have a strong
incentive to chose a location diﬀerent from the one of the pioneer, thereby deﬂecting
its demand. Hence, it follows that the ﬁnal distribution of shops is more similar to the
one resulting from the symmetric case precisely because the position of the pioneer
is further away. Even though this result may not hold for every single parameter
combination, the average values given in table 2 indicate that it indeed holds for a
relevant subset of the considered cases. It is summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 1 If the pioneers’s position is varied, cum grano salis, the resulting dis-
tributions of shops are more similar in the cases of a central and a peripheral position,
relative to intermediate cases. Excluded from this proposition are the distributions
which result from the cases when the pioneer’s location is at the endmost position.





















Reference distribution yields from pioneer located at position
10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
10 0 19.83 24.70 25.18 20.35 18.50 16.74 20.38 17.29 22.24
9 19.83 0 19.41 21.74 24.44 18.97 22.57 17.81 20.98 21.08
8 24.70 19.41 0 22.75 24.38 24.32 21.71 24.55 18.81 25.15
7 25.18 21.74 22.75 0 24.92 22.60 25.25 21.63 27.20 22.76
6 20.35 24.44 24.38 24.92 0 21.92 22.48 24.41 21.03 25.39
5 18.50 18.97 24.32 22.60 21.92 0 20.43 19.16 20.77 22.16
4 16.74 22.57 21.71 25.25 22.48 20.43 0 19.42 18.17 22.73
3 20.38 17.81 24.55 21.63 24.41 19.16 19.42 0 19.82 19.30
2 17.29 20.98 18.81 27.20 21.03 20.77 18.17 19.82 0 20.99
1 22.24 21.08 25.15 22.76 25.39 22.16 22.73 19.30 20.99 0
Average 20.58 20.76 22.86 23.78 23.26 20.98 21.06 20.72 20.56 22.42
Table 2: Average MOD values for alternative reference distributions
historic starting position mold an equilibrium distribution of shops. The ﬁrst step
is that we have to deﬁne a reference case in terms of where the pioneer’s site is
(the ’initial distribution’). In the next step we use the MOD to assess how similar
the resulting distributions are if the position of the pioneer is varied, but the other
(economic) parameters are held constant. If the MOD is low, we can conclude that the
distributions are relatively similar in spite of the variation of the pioneer’s position:
Economic forces prevail over ’history’. If however a high value of the MOD results
although the elasticity of substitution (represented by ρ), the advantage of a common
location (α) and transport costs (T) are the same, the historically determined initial
position has prevailed over economic forces.
Concerning the determination of the reference distribution, we have ten outcomes,
corresponding to alternative positions of the pioneer, for each of the 210 considered
combinations of the variables ρ, α and T. It seems advisable to deﬁne the outcome of
one of these ten cases the standard throughout to guarantee comparability. We chose
to deﬁne the outcomes of the symmetric cases, where the pioneer is located at market
position 10 as reference for three reasons.
First, table 2 shows that the symmetric cases exhibit the second lowest average
value of the MOD, which means that the outcomes can justiﬁably be characterized as
typical. Second, it is to be expected that the average MOD would remain constant in
the symmetric cases if the mirrored cases f(1) = 11,...19 would be included, while it
would increase in all other cases, where the locations of the pioneers are further away
in average. Third, the result that the proﬁts of the pioneer are independent from its
16location is an artefact of the assumed CES utility function and iceberg transport costs.
Only in this special case all market positions are equally likely to be chosen by the
pioneer. If, for instance, the price elasticity of demand increases with the price, the
retailer would gain from a central location where the average distance from consumers
and therefore the elasticity of demand are lowest. Then, it would be straightforward
to see consider the outcome of the cases where the pioneer is located in the center
as benchmark cases. Therefore, by taking the outcome of the symmetric cases as
reference, we reduce the danger that our results depend too much on the assumed
functions. In a similar vein, the central position would be more likely to be chosen by
the pioneer, if strategic interdependencies would not be disregarded. Even if proﬁts
of the pioneer are the same at each position, a central location would reduce the risk
that sequencing retailers build an agglomeration which renders the ﬁrm unproﬁtable.
How does the speciﬁcation of the economic parameters impact on the relationship
between ’economy’ and ’history’? Figure 3 shows how the value of the MOD depends
on α, ρ and T. The results are summarized in propositions 2-4. In calculating these
values we average over all MOD values with the respective feature characteristic. For
instance, in the part of the ﬁgure where the inﬂuence of α is examined, the value for
α = 0.4 is the average of 270 MOD values (6 diﬀerent values of ρ times 5 values of T
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Fig. 3: Measured diﬀerences for diﬀerent settings
Figure 3 reveals that the impact of the pioneer’s position on the equilibrium
distribution of retail shops is stronger if i) the consumers’ advantage of a common
location of several shops is large, if ii) the degree of competition is low, and iii) if
transport costs are low. The course of the ﬁgures and their comparison render possible
some more insights which merit our attention. The interpretation of the left-hand part
of the ﬁgure is quite straightforward: If consumers save much transaction costs by
choosing shops that are clustered at a common location, there is a strong incentive for
shops to build agglomerations. Hence, the location of existing shops matters strongly
for the choice of subsequent ﬁrms. If, by contrast, there is less advantage in choosing
17the same location as other ﬁrms, the trade-oﬀ between ’history’ and ’economy’ is
altered in favor of the latter. But even in the extreme case where no transaction
costs can be saved (α = 0), the distributions of shops that result from diﬀerent initial
settings are not the same because the incumbent ﬁrms still have an impact on the
location choice of newcomers: Firms avoid locations nearby other ﬁrms. Proposition 2
summarizes these results.
Proposition 2 Positive external eﬀects that arise if several shops share the same
location reduce the similarity of the equilibrium distributions of shops from diﬀerent
initial distributions.
The central part of the ﬁgure shows that the eﬀect of an increase in the degree
of competition is not steady-going. In general, more competition (a higher ρ) leads
to a more disperse structure of the locations. Consumers regard the products as close
substitutes, so they are less likely to consume many diﬀerent varieties because of the
ﬁxed costs that come along with each purchase. Therefore, it is proﬁtable for ﬁrms
to locate nearby consumers, i.e. dispersedly. When ρ approaches one, the elasticity
of substitution approaches inﬁnity. For ρ = 0.9 there is one shop at each market
position in equilibrium, i.e. a perfectly even distribution of retail shops, regardless of
the other parameters. In this extreme case, the MOD’s value is zero. With ρ = 0.8
the same holds true, with the exception of few cases where the advantage of a common
location is large enough to oﬀset the disadvantage of extreme competition. Hence, the
resulting average value of the MOD is small. With ρ = 0.7 there is no combination of
the other parameters left which yields an even distribution of retailers. Therefore, the
resulting average MOD value is relatively high. Even smaller values of ρ increase the
dissimilitude of the resulting distributions further, but to a lesser extent. Proposition 3
recapitulates the main result:
Proposition 3 If the varieties are close substitutes, the resulting equilibrium distri-
bution of shops is relatively even, and hence less dependent of the initial distribution.
The right-hand part of ﬁgure 3 illustrates that variations of the transport costs
parameter, T, have a relatively small eﬀect on the similarity of the equilibrium dis-
tribution of ﬁrms and the MOD. If transport costs are relatively small, an increase in
transport costs lower the value of the MOD, i.e. the resulting distributions of ﬁrms
become more similar. The reason is again that the distributions of ﬁrms become more
even if transport costs increase, and the pioneer’s location is less important if ﬁrms
are distributed all over the market in at least one stage of the evolutionary process.
18If transport costs are already relatively high, a further increase has only negligible
eﬀects on the similarity of the resulting distributions, however. One contrary eﬀect,
which may be responsible for the weak impact of transport costs is that they pro-
tect ﬁrms from competition. Therefore, with sizable advantages of common locations,
agglomerations may arise and become sustainable once they have a certain size at pe-
ripheral positions of the market, where the pioneer’s historically determined location
is. This eﬀect works against more similar distributions of ﬁrms and may explain why
the MOD even rises slightly for very high transport costs. Our result is summarized
in proposition 4
Proposition 4 Variations of the transport costs have only a very limited eﬀect on
the heterogeneity of the equilibrium distribution of ﬁrms.
It is unfortunately inevitable that our results hinge to some extent on the em-
ployed measure of dissimilarity. Because of this circumstance we put so much eﬀort
in explaining the MOD and the intuition behind it. The amenability of our results
for straightforward interpretations seems to support its plausibility. Of course, the
exact course of the ﬁgures must be interpreted with caution, even though we tried
to increase the reliability of our results by a large number of runs. For instance, one
should not over-interpret the slight increase of the MOD when transport costs are
very high. Nonetheless, the simulation of the retailers’ location choices enables us to
assess not only the direction of a dependency, but also its strength. For instance, we
were able to qualify the impact of transport costs on the similarity of the ﬁrms’ equi-
librium distribution as relatively weak. This underlines the adequateness of numerical
simulations as a tool of research in this ﬁeld.
4 Summary and conclusions
The aim of this paper is to examine under which conditions the spatial equilibrium
distribution of retail shops is shaped more by historic singularities or by economic
forces. We develop a discrete model of location choice with heterogenous goods and
iceberg transport costs. In the simulations of the location choice of subsequent ﬁrms
we vary the location of the pioneering ﬁrm, which is taken as representing ’history’. We
then compared the resulting equilibrium distributions of shops by means of a ’measure
of dissimilarity’ (MOD). This measure indicates how many hypothetical moves of ﬁrms
would have to be made to transform one distribution into another. We calculated its
value respectively for two distributions that result from diﬀerent positions of the
pioneer, but with equal ’economic’ parameters. One of the two distributions is the
19one that results from a central position of the pioneer, respectively. If the value is low,
the two distributions of ﬁrms are relatively equal in spite of diﬀerent initial settings.
Hence, economic forces prevailed over ’history’. If however the MOD’s value is large
in spite of identical economic parameters, ’history’ has dominated.
A number of limitations and caveats follow from the assumptions of the the-
oretical model and from the use of speciﬁc functions and parameter values in the
simulations. First, we employed a partial equilibrium view, i.e. we abstracted from
interdependencies between the goods and inputs markets. For instance, an agglomera-
tion of ﬁrms of one branch may lead to a concentration of workers that are specialized
in the type of labor that these ﬁrms need, which augments the comparative advan-
tage of this location even further. Moreover, an agglomeration of economic activity
increases income, which may in turn have a positive impact on demand. All such ’for-
ward and backward linkages’ incontestably exist, and they are at issue in a number of
recent publications, not only within the ’New Economic Geography’. Ignoring these
eﬀects may yet be sensible at a low geographic scale. Explaining the concentration
of ﬁnancial institutions in London may require the consideration of specialized labor.
But the latter can hardly explain why we prefer buying fruits at a market with many
market stalls, and why e.g. antique shops or fashion boutiques are so much concen-
trated within a city. This is to say, the model is more appropriate for explaining
location choices within cities than at a larger geographic scale.
The combination of iceberg transport costs and a constant elasticity (CES) utility
function facilitates the analysis considerably. Since the ﬁrms’ mill price depends on
the elasticity of substitution, which is constant throughout each ﬁrm’s market area,
the price remains constant as well. But this must not be the case. If we had assumed,
say, linear demand functions, the elasticity of demand would increase with the distance
from the ﬁrm. In this case, the equilibrium price of each ﬁrm would depend negatively
on the extension of its respective market. The opposite holds true if the elasticity of
demand decreases with distance. Hence, in the absence of any good reason why the
elasticity of demand should increase or decrease with distance, it is possibly not a too
bad approximation to assume that it is constant.
Our main results are (see propositions 1-4):
• For given economic conditions, the equilibrium distributions of shops are more
similar if the pioneer is located in the center of the market or at peripheral
positions, than if the ﬁrm is located at intermediate positions.
• Positive external eﬀects of co-location imply that the historical position of the
20pioneer is more important for the equilibrium distribution, hence the distribu-
tions which result from diﬀerent choices of the pioneer are less similar if these
eﬀects are strong.
• The easier it is for consumers to substitute one variety by another one, the less
important is the initial setting.
• Due to mutually opposing eﬀects, transport costs have only a weak impact on
the similarity of the distributions of shops resulting from diﬀerent positions of
the pioneer.
Not surprisingly, we found that the equilibrium distribution of ﬁrms depends both
on the combination of economic parameters and the initial setting. Given that in
reality the location pattern of ﬁrms from diﬀerent branches is varying strongly, one
would not even appreciate more clear-cut results. If goods in one sector are almost
perfect substitutes, the model predicts, the resulting distribution is almost even. This
is the case e.g. for tobacco shops and the like. If however the goods are relatively
heterogenous, and/ or (reducing) transaction costs is paying for consumers, a more
concentrated spatial structure yields. Examples are fashion boutiques and antique
shops. Therefore, one would have to assess the relationship of these parameters to
predict the spatial distribution of ﬁrms in a speciﬁc sector of the economy. In those
cases, where the positive external eﬀects of choosing the same location are strong,
the model predicts that an agglomeration arises where the ﬁrst ﬁrm is located. This
common location may be ineﬃcient, though, since only the central position minimizes
total transport costs. In this respect, a calibration of the model to a speciﬁc situation
may provide some guidance to city planners regarding the question whether the loca-
tion of ﬁrms should be inﬂuenced at an early stage of the product cycle or an eﬃcient
outcome can be expected even without an intervention.
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22Appendix
A Some are more equal than others
To decide to which extent the equilibrium distribution of shops depends on the initial
distribution or on economic forces we need a measure to quantify diﬀerences in several
dimensions. If two spatial distributions of ﬁrms are equal in spite of diﬀerent initial
conditions, one may conclude that economic forces are dominant in this case. Yet,
simply stating that the equilibrium distributions are equal or not equal would abstract
from potentially interesting intermediate results and interpretations. If the ultimate
distribution of ﬁrms in the two cases diﬀers at only one position by only one ﬁrm, it
would be misleading to conclude that ’history’ has prevailed over economic forces. An
appropriately deﬁned measure of similarity would render possible to state that one
distribution of ﬁrms is more similar to a benchmark distribution than another one.
What would such a measure of (dis)similarity have to account for? The measure
has to weight the diﬀerences between two distributions of ﬁrms in several dimensions.
The outcome of two simulation runs may diﬀer with respect to the number of ﬁrms,
the number of locations, the locations themselves, and the distribution of ﬁrms be-
tween locations. Of course, they may also be diﬀerent in several or even all of these
dimensions. Figure 4 illustrates these cases for the example of a length 5-market
(r = 5).






























































Fig. 4: Example distributions of ﬁrms, r = 5
23Cases 1 and 2 merely diﬀer with respect to the number of ﬁrms at the single
location at market position 3. In case 3 the number of ﬁrms is same as in case 2, but
the location is now at position 2. In case 4, there are two locations, positions 2 and
3, where respectively half of the ﬁrms reside. Case 5 combines all these diﬀerences:
It is diﬀerent from all other cases with respect to the number of ﬁrms and locations,
where ﬁrms locate, and how they are distributed. If one compares the situation in
case 2 with all other situations, it is quite evident that case 5 is diﬀering mostly. But
it is not as easy to assess which of the other cases is more similar to case 2 because
such a judgement necessarily relies on normative weights one attaches to diﬀerences
in the number of ﬁrms, the number of locations or one of the other dimensions.
Even though the weighting will always remain normative, it is possible to iden-
tify some desirable features the measure should exhibit. Below, these features are
somewhat grandiosely referred to as axioms. Since there is no upper limit of how
diﬀerent two distributions of ﬁrms may be, it is diﬃcult to deﬁne a point of origin
of a measure of similarity, however. Therefore, we reverse the view and construct a
measure of dissimilarity, ϕ. The ﬁrst 4 axioms are the standard metric axioms (see
e.g. Santini and Jain, 1999), which have been discussed in quite detail, and mostly
controversial since Tversky (1977). The discussion, whether or not the feature space
may be mapped adequately by a metric space is not relevant here, as long as we are
in fact considering a metric space. However, if distances are interpreted as product
diﬀerentiation in a characteristic space, the adequacy of a metric measure becomes
questionable. Before we state the ﬁrst axiom, a precise deﬁnition of ’distribution of
ﬁrms’ seems at order:
Deﬁnition 2 A distribution of ﬁrms ω is a vector of length r, where the k’s element
is nk, ω(k) = nk. In other words, the vector assigns to each location the corresponding
number of ﬁrms. Ω is the set of all distributions.
The ﬁrst two axioms deﬁne the point of origin of the measure ϕ.
Axiom 1: Equal distributions
ϕjj ≡ ϕωj,ωj = ϕω˜ j,ω˜ j ≡ ϕ˜ j˜ j
where ωj,ω˜ j ∈ Ω are two diﬀerent distributions of ﬁrms. That is to say, if identical
distributions are being compared, the measure ϕ exhibits always the same value. The
second axiom is:
Axiom 2: Minimality
ϕjj ≤ ϕj˜ j
24i.e. the smallest value of ϕ, corresponding to a maximum of similarity, is assigned
to identical distributions of ﬁrms. This value may be standardized to zero without
further loss of generality. The third axiom reads:
Axiom 3: Symmetry (1)
ϕςj = ϕjς
If two distributions are being compared, the order of the comparison should be mean-
ingless. With a higher number of distributions, however, it becomes important, which
case is chosen as reference. Imagine, for instance, that two distributions of ﬁrms are
equal, and the third is very diﬀerent from them. Then, deﬁning the latter as reference
distribution, would yield two high values of ϕ, but the piece of information that the
two are equal would be lost. Thus, it is advisable to deﬁne a typical distribution as
reference. The fourth metric axiom is:
Axiom 4: Triangle Inequality
ϕςj + ϕj˜ j ≥ ϕς˜ j
Unlike the other axioms, the triangle inequality cannot be expressed in ordinal terms,
which makes it diﬃcult to falsify (Tversky, 1977). Applied to our context, it essentially
states that the sum of measured dissimilarity between the reference (ωj) and two other
distributions of ﬁrms is greater or equal to what would be measured if one would
compare the two other distributions directly.
In addition to these axioms, which are fairly standard in the literature on math-
ematical psychology, we impose the two following axioms. The ﬁrst additional axiom
is:
Axiom 5: Symmetry (2)
ϕςj = ϕ˜ ς˜ j, with ˜ ωj(i) = ωj(r − i + 1) ∀i ∈ D
and ˜ ως(i) = ως(r − i + 1) ∀i ∈ D
Thus, the measure must have the same value as before, if both distributions are
reversed from left to right. If a measure violates this condition, it would matter from
which end of the market a comparison of two ﬁnal distributions of ﬁrms would start.
By imposing this condition, we are able to restrict the analysis to initial locations in
half of the market, because the same results must apply for the remaining half. The
second additional axiom is
25Axiom 6: Independence from the number of distributions
if ϕςj = a, with ως,ωj ∈ Ω, a ∈ <
+
then ϕςj = a, ∀Ωh : ως,ωj ⊂ Ωh
This axiom requires that adding or deleting elements of the set of distributions which
are being compared (Ω) does not alter the value of the MOD between any two distribu-
tions, provided that these two distributions are still within the set. This requirement
ensures that the results of a survey may be carried forward to other issues which are
analyzed. One shortcoming of this assumption is that it is not possible to standardize
the measure to be in the interval [0,1], since there is no upper limit of diﬀerences
between two distributions, which may be assigned the value 1.
The latter assertion points to the fact that there is not only a single measure
which fulﬁlls all the requirements given in axioms 1–6. The circumstance that the
measure has no upper limit, together with axioms 1, 4 and 5, implies that if there is
a measure ϕ which fulﬁlls the axioms, then the measure a·ϕ, a ∈ <+, is appropriate,
too. That is, every multiple of the measure would meet with axioms 1–6 just as well.
The MOD between two distributions of ﬁrms, ως (the reference) and ωk, we
propose is presented in equation (14). It has all the properties axioms 1–6 call for. The
intuition behind our measure is that it calculates the necessary number of hypothetical
movements of ﬁrms from one location to a neighboring one in order to transform
one distribution of ﬁrms into the reference distribution. To explain the underlying
idea let us compare cases 1 (deﬁned the reference) and 5 in ﬁgure 4, and ﬁrstly
focus on the ﬁrst double sum within the braces. For j = 1 the inner sum simply
calculates the diﬀerence between the number of ﬁrms at market position 1 in the
cases of both distributions, which is 1 in our example (imagine, this ﬁrm is moved to
position 2, which is illustrated by red numbers in ﬁgure 5’s upper part). For j = 2, the
number of ﬁrms on market positions 1 and 2 for each distribution is subtracted. The
diﬀerence is now 3, which amounts to moving 3 ﬁrms (to position 3, see ﬁgure 5). The
sum of diﬀerences, calculated by the outer sum is 4. To yield the actual number of
hypothetical movements, which would be necessary to transform one distribution into
the other, the absolute values of these diﬀerences have to be added. For j = 3, the
number of ﬁrms in the cases of both distributions is 3, hence the sum of movements
remains 4. In the last step, 3 ﬁrms that reside on position 5 have to be moved by one
step to be outside the market, which yields a sum of 7 movements.
There is one problem with the measure until here, however. Namely, if both
distributions are reversed from left to right, the measure takes a diﬀerent value, in
this case 11, as can easily be veriﬁed (see the lower part of ﬁgure 5. This contradicts
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Fig. 5: Transforming one distribution into another
axiom 5. The reason is that the supernumerary ﬁrms in case 5 have to be moved
further, if we start adding up the diﬀerences at the right market border. To eliminate
this problem, the second double sum calculates the number of hypothetical movements
from the right to the left border of the market. The ﬁnal measure is simply the average
of both double sums, in our example (7 + 11)/2 = 9. To average over the number
of hypothetical movements from both ends of the market brings about that, if the
number of ﬁrms diﬀers by one, the measure increases by (r +1)/2, in our example by
3, no matter where the diﬀerence occurs. Another property is that if two distributions
diﬀer from the reference distribution only with respect to the location of one ﬁrm, the
measure ϕ is the higher, the more the location of this ﬁrm is displaced in relation to
the reference distribution.
Table 3 summarizes the values of our measure ϕ for each case in ﬁgure 4. Col-
umn 1 respectively gives the reference distribution, the cases in the ﬁrst row are
compared to it. A glance at the table shows that the ﬁrst two axioms are fulﬁlled.
Comparing one distribution with itself always yields a value of zero, hence axioms 1
and 2 are met. Second, the lower left half and the upper right half of the matrix are
27symmetric, which signiﬁes that axiom 3 is met, too. Axioms 4, 5, and 6 are fulﬁlled
by construction.
case 1 case 2 case 3 case 4 case 5
P
case 1 0 3 6 4 9 23
case 2 3 0 4 2 9 18
case 3 6 4 0 2 9 21
case 4 4 2 2 0 8 16
case 5 9 9 9 8 0 35
Table 3: Measure of dissimilarity (MOD), ϕ, example values
The table shows that case 4 displays the smallest values of the measure in average
(the sum of the measures is 16). Compared to the next best case 2, it is less similar
to case 1, but this is more than oﬀset by a higher similarity to cases 3 and 5.
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